Strategic regional and national economic development with fiscal equalization by HO, Lok Sang
Lingnan University
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working
Paper Series
Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中
心
2008
Strategic regional and national economic
development with fiscal equalization
Lok Sang HO
lsho@ln.edu.hk
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp
Part of the Finance Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中心 at Digital Commons @
Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.
Recommended Citation
Ho, L. S. (2008). Strategic regional and national economic development with fiscal equalization (CPPS Working Paper Series
No.191). Retrieved from Lingnan University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp/90/
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
Centre for Public Policy Studies 
Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
No. 191 (Jun 08) CPPS 
 
 
Strategic Regional and National Economic 
Development with Fiscal Equalization 
 
 
Lok Sang Ho 
 
 
   
 Lingnan University 
Hong Kong 
 
 
Strategic Regional and National Economic Development  
with Fiscal Equalization 
 
 
Lok Sang Ho 
 
June 2008 
 
 
ã Lok Sang Ho 
 
Lok Sang Ho is Professor of Economics and Director of Centre for 
Public Policy Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Public Policy Studies 
Lingnan University 
Tuen Mun 
Hong Kong 
Tel: (852) 2616 7182 
Fax: (852) 2591 0690 
Email: cpps@LN.edu.hk 
http://www.LN.edu.hk/cpps/ 
 
 
CAPS and CPPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion 
and critical comment.  Opinions expressed in them are the author’s 
and should not be taken as representing the opinions of the Centres 
or Lingnan University.  These papers may be freely circulated but 
they are not to be quoted without the written permission of the 
author.  Please address comments and suggestions to the author. 
 
 1 
Strategic Regional and National Economic Development  
with Fiscal Equalization 
 
Lok Sang Ho* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper shows that under increasing returns, devoting resources to 
develop some regions strategically ahead of other regions make sense, but 
this does not imply that the other regions have to wait until the benefits of 
economic growth to trickle down.  Fiscal equalization can and should be 
more aggressive, with the central government incurring a deficit to help 
the poorer regions, and the national debt thus caused to be repaid by 
higher taxes on the fast growing regions.  Optimal fiscal equalization 
should also involve central government’s investment in certain kinds of 
public infrastructure in the local economies of the backward regions based 
on social cost benefit analysis.  China’s increasing regional income 
disparity is therefore unnecessary.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A developing country often faces the dilemma of whether or not to focus 
its investment on some strategic areas that will produce the greatest returns.  
To do so would risk ignoring the needs of some of the least developed 
areas. But focusing on some areas first— particularly those industries with 
large forward and backward linkages, has been recognized to be a sound 
development strategy for a long time (Hirschman, 1958). Mr Deng 
Xiao-ping, widely recognized as the architect of modern China, had 
similarly recommended a strategy of “allowing a small portion of the 
population to turn rich ahead of others.”  Such a strategy would make 
sense in a world with increasing returns to investment.  Increasing returns 
                                                 
* Lok Sang Ho is also Hon. Research Fellow of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at 
Lingnan University and of the HK Institute of Asian Pacific Studies of the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong.  This paper is written for the Shanghai Forum 2008 hosted by Fudan 
University 24-27 May, 2008.  The discussion on hyperbolic discounting under Section 4 is 
drawn from my book manuscript: Practical Principles of Public Policy, Chapter 2. I thank 
Robin Boadway, Gustav Ranis, and Guanghua Wan for comments on this paper. 
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means as you put into the system more and more input, the output gets 
disproportionately bigger.  Graphically, this means that instead of a 
development possibility curve that is concave to the origin, as in Figure 1, 
we would have, instead, one that exhibits convexity to the origin.  If 
increasing returns and decreasing returns co-exist, then we may have 
convexity and concavity at the same time, as in Figure 2. 
 
We assume a nation with two regions A and B. We assume that there is a 
pool of “discretionary capital” that can be allocated between region A and 
B and that all capital invested will be efficiently utilized. Two axes then 
depict the present values of the income streams accruing to A and to B 
associated with an investment strategy as represented by any point on the 
development possibility curve.  If there is no discretionary capital 
allocated to A at all, development value will be “Min D for A”.  If all the 
discretionary capital is allocated to A, development will be “Max D for A.”  
Similar interpretation goes for “Min D for B” and for “Max D for B.”  In 
Figure 1, with decreasing returns, the optimal strategy will be where the 
“Development Possibility Curve” touches the highest 45 degree line. 
 
In Figure 2 we assume there is increasing returns to investment over some 
ranges.  Increasing returns means that as more of the discretionary capital 
is allocated to B instead of to A, at some point greater returns accrue to A 
than is the sacrifice suffered by B.  With increasing returns over some 
ranges of the development possibility frontier, there are multiple local 
optimums.  However, between the local optimums K and Q, obviously the 
present value associated with Q is bigger.  So from the nation’s point of 
view, B should be favored. At Q, the nation can maximize the present 
value of development focusing more on developing B.
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Figure 1: Development Possibilities under Decreasing Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Case of Local Increasing Returns (Development PV on both axes) 
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However, this does not mean that A has to suffer.  Indeed, given the 
higher present value of development it is possible to improve the welfare 
of both Region A and Region B over what is possible if development 
strategy K is adopted. 
 
This will imply NOT ONLY some form of transfer payments to Region A, 
BUT ALSO borrowing. But to the extent that the investment to B may still 
take time to bear fruit, total disposable income in B today may not be high 
enough to support the transfer. If in fact the investment is going to be so 
profitable, however, so that incomes are going to rise in B due to that 
investment, it should be possible to borrow to sustain a better living 
standard in A as well as in B. There would be no need to wait till the 
“trickling down process” benefit the backward region. The constraint of 
course is that what is borrowed will need to be repaid and that the 
investment has to be able to support the repayment of such borrowing.  
What transpires from this analysis is that the central government may run a 
deficit to help A, and repay the debt thus raised by taxing B harder in the 
future.   
 
2. Regional Disparity and Equalization in China 
 
Now let us go back to the case of China. Region B is like China’s coastal 
cities. Region B is like China’s inland provinces. In the 1980s China had 
opened up in the first instance 14 cities and set up 4 Special Economic 
Zones, giving them special status in terms of policy privileges.  This 
encouraged the inflow of investment into these regions, both from outside 
China and from inside. At the same time, however, much of the inland 
provinces did not enjoy the benefit of inflow of capital. However, many of 
them did receive transfer payments from the central government. 
 
According to Wang and Fan (2003), the central government had adopted a 
fiscal transfer policy to redress the regional disparity between the eastern 
and the western regions of the country from the 1950s.  A large amount of 
investment poured into the western provinces, but efficiency was low.  
Then in the beginning of the economic reform period, the central 
government tried to motivate provincial governments to improve efficiency 
and reduced the tax intake from them. As a result, resources available for 
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transfers dwindled, while the eastern region spearheaded to new heights 
every year.  As a result disparity widened rapidly. 
 
In 1980 the per capita GDP for the central and west regions were 65% and 
53% of that of the eastern region.  By 2000 these percentages had 
dropped to 53% and 41%.  As shown in Table 1, although fiscal 
equalization did raise per capita disposable incomes, over the years the per 
capita disparity in disposable income has not improved, suggesting that not 
enough had been done by way of equalization payments. As long as the 
greater returns from investment are real, the nation’s total wealth increases 
instantly in terms of present value.  This should allow inter-regional 
transfers to benefit the unfavored region as much as the favored region. 
Initially some borrowing may be necessary, but the borrowing can be 
serviced as the returns from the investment kick in.  
 
Table 1. Equalization Did not Improve Disparity over the Years 
Region 1980 2000 2000/1980 
Eastern Region 
GDP per capita 
(Benchmark normalized to 100) 
100 100 1 
Eastern Region 
Disposable Income Per capita 
(Benchmark normalized to 100) 
100 100 1 
Central Region 
GDP/capita 
65 53 81.5 
Central Region 
Disposable Income/capita 
78 62 79.4 
Western Region 
GDP/capita 
53 41 77.3 
Western Region 
Disposable Income/capita 
70 54 77.1 
Source: Wang and Fan (2003) 
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3. Migration and the “Migrant Worker Model of Development” 
 
The statistics in the previous section notwithstanding, the key income 
disparity on the mainland is that between rural and urban residents. The 
richest “regions” remain, of course, to be the big cities that lie at or near 
the coast in the east of China. In the discussion below, we will focus on 
transfers to the rural population, with the understanding that an effective 
system of transfers to the rural population will benefit the “western region.”  
 
Fiscal equalization is of course not the only means of “equalization.” 
Another important means of equalization occurs when workers migrate to 
the eastern region and derive an income there.  The job opportunities have 
been increased by the greater investment.  Although GDP per capita is 
higher in the cities, part of the incomes earned actually accrues to migrant 
workers who can transfer their incomes back to their original locations.  
Thus, “disposable income per capita” in the western region and in rural 
areas in general is augmented not only by the public channel through fiscal 
transfers, but also by the private channel through personal income transfers.  
This pattern has been borne out by data supplied in the Wang and Fan 
(2003) article. 
 
It is estimated that some 200 million migrants are working in cities, but 
they do not have household registration (hukou) in the cities and they are 
discriminated against in employment, education, healthcare, and housing. 
 
Concomitant to the migration of workers to the cities in the eastern region 
of course is the loss of workers in the rural areas, especially those in the 
western region. However, this is not a concern given the existence of 
surplus labor in the western region. What is more important from the point 
of view of developing the western region is for these poorer areas to have 
more disposable incomes. Thus fiscal transfers and personal income 
transfers potentially improve the quality of life in the western region. 
 
In principle, wages in the cities in the eastern region has to be attractive 
before workers in the rural areas would migrate.  The attractiveness of 
this model of development is that wages can be attractive to workers from 
the west even though the meager wages cannot support a family living 
where the work is and are therefore internationally competitive. This is 
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because the cost of living is much lower in the underdeveloped western 
region, so that what may appear to be a low wage to city dwellers living 
along the coast may still be very attractive to migrant workers. Some 
figures will illustrate: according to the China Daily (May 16 2006) the 
minimum wage in Beijing in 2004 was 545 yuan per month (US$67.2), just 
20% of the city’s average income, while the minimum wage in Shanghai 
stood at 635 yuan (US$78.2), about 25% of the city’s average income.  
Researcher Liu Jun-sheng of the Income Research Institute of Labor and 
Social Security, found that the minimum wage in 2004 in 25 provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities was less than local average 
monthly living requirements.  Clearly the jobs would only appeal to 
migrant workers who came from locations where wages were much lower. 
 
Without the migrant workers’ contribution China could not have been so 
competitive. The availability of the migrant labor had allowed the eastern 
region to develop much faster than otherwise,1 further contributing to the 
increasing returns of infrastructure investment and investment in plant and 
equipment. Fiscal transfers from the richer regions to the poor regions 
where the migrant workers came from are therefore well justified.  
 
4. Fiscal Transfers in the Face of the Household Registration System 
 
Given China’s household registration (hukou) system, part of the fiscal 
transfer may be in the form of a wage subsidy to those whose household 
registration is in a rural, backward region, regardless of where the worker 
works. Thus a migrant worker working in a city would get the wage 
subsidy, just as a worker who stays behind in his village or his hometown 
to work.  To the extent that his registration is not in the city, we know he 
is a migrant worker, and the subsidy will eventually find its way to help 
sustain a higher consumption level in the rural areas. 
 
Traditionally, the hukou system has effectively discriminated the migrant 
worker because he normally will not have the social security and other 
benefits that the city resident enjoys. Students without the requisite hukou, 
for example, need higher marks at the university entrance examination in 
order to get into university.  While some changes are taking place 
                                                 
1 For example, average incomes in Beijing and Shanghai were rising at about 15% per year 
from 1994 to 2004, when the China economy grew at 9.5% annual rate. 
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recently: for example, in 2002, Shanghai launched an insurance scheme for 
its migrant workers, and employers are required to contribute to pensions 
for the workers as well as cover work-related injuries, and health insurance,  
these do not involve public subsidies and in particular do not involve any 
fiscal transfers.  In view of the above analysis, wage subsidies from the 
central government financed by taxes or future taxes on the more 
prosperous cities for workers with rural hukou would make sense.   
 
In recent years, there is increasing talk about eliminating the hukou system 
in China (China Daily, HK edition, January 23, 2008). But there is 
lingering worry over the risks associated with rapid population growth in 
cities. For example, commenting over a proposal by Tsinghua University 
professor Qin Hui for Shenzhen to set aside land to build low-cost housing 
for low income people including migrant workers, Ge Hong, 
Vice-chairman of Shenzhen Academy of Social Sciences, expressed 
reservation.(April 16, 2008 China Daily)  One possibility is that people 
from the rural areas are allowed to change their hukou to the cities if they 
so desire, but then they will have to give up the wage subsidy that is 
designated for the rural residents. 
 
5. Public Investment and Optimal Fiscal Equalization 
 
China’s infrastructure investment relies both on government and private 
inputs.  For private investment in infrastructure, expected profitability is 
crucial, and investors essentially derive returns from tolls and charges.  
They are invariably attracted to the coastal areas where incomes are high 
and economic growth is expected to be fastest. However, public investment 
does not have to be commercially viable.  As long as social benefits justify 
the social costs, a project would be worthwhile.  As long as no better 
project comes along, the project under consideration should go ahead.   
 
Optimal fiscal equalization requires not only an optimal amount of transfer 
from the strategically favored region to the backward region but also an 
optimal split between cash transfer and public investment.  The former 
implies moving along the 45 degree line from point Q up in Region A’s 
favor until the marginal social benefit is equal to the marginal social cost, 
where marginal social benefit = the benefit accruing to the people of 
Region A and the marginal social cost = the loss suffered by the people of 
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Region B as the transfer takes place.  The latter implies equalizing the 
marginal benefit of today’s consumption and the marginal present value 
benefit due to higher future consumption made possible by the public 
investment.   
 
One might think that cash transfer to the regional government allows the 
greatest flexibility and so may promote efficiency better than public 
investment.  If the regional governments can be counted upon to 
maximize the long term interest of the people of the region this conclusion 
may well hold.  However, the regional governments may have their own 
agenda, and there may also be a pro-present-consumption bias due to what 
is sometimes called hyperbolic discounting. 2   Under hyperbolic 
discounting, when policy makers need to choose between two competing 
projects, one of which brings in a more distant benefit stream than another 
one, they tend to bias their choices toward the one that will bring more 
immediate benefits.  Postponing the benefits that are so close at hand is 
perceived to involve a bigger sacrifice than postponing the benefits that 
will accrue some years down the road.  Hyperbolic discounting involves 
applying different discount rates to different projects. If so when the 
central government makes a transfer, it may require that a certain budget 
be assigned for specific infrastructure investment that is based on 
application of more objective cost benefit analysis, which would appear to 
be more likely with the central government than with the local government.  
 
To explain this we can refer to a growing literature on “hyperbolic 
discounting.”  In traditional cost benefit analysis, future benefit streams 
and cost streams have to be discounted to the present and then compared to 
assess if a project is worthwhile.  Hyperbolic discounting says that the 
annual rate of discount that applies to near-term benefits will rise 
significantly as implementation gets more and more imminent.  
Postponing a project that can bring immediate benefit by one year then is 
perceived to entail a huge sacrifice— far larger than that associated with 
postponing a project scheduled nine years away by one additional year, or 
postponing a project that brings distant benefits. This can be explained 
with the Figure 3.1 and 3.2. 
                                                 
2 Dasgupta and Maskin (2004) explained hyperbolic discounting as the tendency for decision 
makers to increase the rate of discount as the time before payoffs are realized grows shorter 
and shorter.  
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Figure 3.1: Total Perceived Benefits of Two Projects in Today’s Dollars 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Perceived MB and MC of Postponing One Project to Expedite Another 
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Figure 3.1 shows the perception about net benefits of two projects, 
assuming the projects are implemented at different dates.  It is assumed 
that the project promising more distant benefits has higher net benefit than 
the one promising nearer-term benefits.  If the projects are postponed, 
perceived net benefits decline for both projects, but for the project 
promising immediate benefits, the value is discounted at a much higher 
rate because of hyperbolic discounting. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the perceived marginal cost of postponing the near term 
benefit project.  It is assumed that the benefit of postponing the near term 
benefit project is to bring forward the distant benefit project.  Because of 
hyperbolic discounting, which may be considered a weakness inherent in 
human nature, the marginal cost of postponing the near-term benefit 
project is much higher than that of postponing the distant benefit project.  
So, even though the net benefit of the more distant project is higher, it is 
postponed in favor of the one that brings immediate benefits. 
 
A glaring example of this phenomenon is the tragedy in New Orleans in 
the summer of 2005.  Thus, Malanga of The City Journal wrote:3 
 
today’s federal government isn’t smaller but ever-growing. Its 
priorities, however, both parties have woefully distorted. 
Increasingly, Washington neglects key projects (like shoring up the 
New Orleans levees) in order to shower money on often-superfluous 
projects that local congressmen favor— ranging from wildlife refuges 
to tennis courts in rich communities to arts and folk festivals to a 
long list of other inessential initiatives. This pork-barrel waste, not 
smaller government, is what victimized New Orleans. 
 
Actually, beyond pure hyperbolic discounting, which is largely a 
perception problem and which has to do with the flaws of human nature, 
there is an institutional bias that will produce what might appear to be a 
result of hyperbolic discounting.  Because the terms of office for elected 
                                                 
3 “Katrina and Pork: How congressional waste harmed New Orleans,” by Steven Malanga, 
The City Journal, 17 October 2005. http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon_10_17_05sm.html 
accessed September 22, 2007.   
 
 12
politicians are limited, they naturally would like to give their constituents, 
particularly those with influence, immediate benefits while they can.  
Future tax burdens or other undesirable consequences that have yet to 
happen are too distant for them to worry about.  Malanga further 
observed: 
increasingly Congress uses the growing federal budget to serve the 
narrow interests of its members, circumventing the traditional 
budget process and skirting procedures for competitive bidding to 
insert favored projects directly into appropriations legislation. The 
process, euphemistically called earmarking, “has become so routine 
and so pervasive . . . that what was once a boon for the most 
powerful and favored has become an expected way for local 
governments and other institutions to get aid from Washington,” 
wrote the Congressional Quarterly last year. 
Another major policy debacle that follows the hyperbolic discounting logic 
relates to the massive failures of Savings and Loans during the early 
1980s.4  Many observers believe that the under-funding of bank regulators 
was one key reason behind the pervasive fraudulent practices in the 
industry. Even though S&Ls were suffering from the upwardly spiraling 
interest rates under Paul Volcker’s chairmanship of the Fed, and from an 
asset/liability mismatch, the problems were greatly aggravated by fraud 
(see Chapter 7).  The “ultimate cost of the savings and loan crisis” was 
estimated at some $160 billion (FDIC, 1997, p.169) At the time, Savings 
and Loans were regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(FHLBB), and its examination force was understaffed, inadequately trained, 
and suffering from limited resources.  A government-wide hiring freeze 
in 1980 to 81 had compounded these problems.  Such belt-tightening was 
in part a result of the Reagan tax cuts,5 but taxpayers over the long term 
lost far more than what they saved momentarily.  Considering the major 
social losses that have resulted from the behavior of short-sighted voters 
and that of politically-savvy politicians, democracy does not come cheap. 
 
                                                 
4 The title of James R. Adams’ book is telling: The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal: How an 
Unholy Alliance of Politics and Money Destroyed America’s Banking System [1990] 
5 The Reagan tax cuts were implemented through the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) 
of 1981 that embodied much of the Kemp-Roth bill providing a 25 percent across-the-board 
cut in personal marginal tax rates. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper argues that to optimize national economic development it 
makes sense to focus investment where returns are greatest, and given the 
prevalence of increasing returns, this tends to polarize incomes and 
exacerbate regional disparities.  However, we argue that it is actually not 
necessarily to wait until the “trickling down process” gradually benefit the 
backward regions.  Instead, fiscal equalization, both through direct fiscal 
transfers and supplemented by borrowing, as well as some infrastructure 
development aimed mainly at boosting effective consumption of both 
private and social goods, can benefit the backward regions immediately.  
This argument is additional to the traditional argument for fiscal 
equalization that is mainly based on regional differences in the gap 
between fiscal capacity and public expenditures. (Boadway and Shah, 2006, 
Chapter 2)  Fiscal transfers can potentially reduce both the income gap 
between the eastern and the western regions and that between rural and 
urban populations.6 
 
We have also demonstrated that devoting more resources to develop B first 
does not mean that A has to suffer in the near term.  If the present value 
of development is truly maximized for the nation, then the nation can 
afford to borrow more so as to boost Region A’s near term consumption, 
even as more of the discretionary capital is allocated to develop B first.  If 
the provincial government is more prone to “hyperbolic discounting”, then 
it may also be desirable for part of the fiscal transfer to be designated on 
certain kinds of infrastructure investment that may have higher present 
values but have a benefit stream that is less “front loaded” as others. 
 
The fiscal transfers would generally imply a short-term fiscal deficit in the 
central government, which will be repaid from higher taxes on the richer 
provinces. Thus optimal fiscal equalization is not confined to 
contemporaneous transfer of incomes, but also may imply higher future tax 
intake from the regions enjoying increasing returns and rapid growth, and 
it may be in the form of a wage subsidy for those with hukou in the 
                                                 
6 Urban townships enjoyed a 10.4% in per capita disposable income to reach 11759 yuan, 
while rural residents had only a 7.4% increase to reach 3587 yuan in 2006. (Mingpao, January 
26, 2007) The percentage increases reported have netted out inflation effects.  Yuan figures 
are nominal. 
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backward areas, as well as in the form of infrastructure investment in such 
items as roads, water supply, electricity, schools, and hospitals. This is how 
the backward regions can benefit immediately without having to wait for 
the trickling down effects to arrive.  According to Chen Xiwen, director 
of the office of the central leading group on rural work, the Central 
Government will increase its budget for rural investment by more than 
25% to 520 billion yuan in 2008 (China Daily HK edition, Feb. 22, 2008). 
This is a step in the right direction, and is well justified in view of the 
arguments in this paper. 
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